



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXII NUMBER 15

## Britain, Egypt and the Sudan — 2

by J. C. Hurewitz

1961

"It was unfortunate from the point of view of future progress [in the Sudan]," observed Lord Lloyd in retrospect, "that the opportunity was not taken when it presented itself to clear away the embarrassing differences which had for so long existed between the actual and the legal positions of the Sudanese administration."

The former British High Commissioner for Egypt (1925-29) was alluding to the fact that Britain had not unilaterally abrogated the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian convention immediately after the assassination by Egyptian nationalists on November 19-20, 1924 of Sir Lee Stack, the sirdar, or commander-in-chief, of the Egyptian Army and the governor-general of the Sudan. Lord Lloyd was indulging in wishful reminiscence. For the opportunity had slipped away nearly three years earlier when Britain, responding to irrepressible nationalist demands, ended its seven-year-old protectorate over Egypt on February 28, 1922. The inauguration at that time of the second British occupation, pending the settlement by Britain and Egypt of their differences, deprived Whitehall of full freedom of action in the Sudan.

•Following Stack's murder late in 1924, Brit-

ain proceeded to squeeze the Egyptians out of the Sudan without formally abolishing the condominium. The evacuation of Egyptian troops left sole responsibility for security with the British garrisons, supplemented by local units, renamed the Sudan Defense Force and commanded by British officers. The annual contribution from Cairo of £1 million toward the cost of the military occupation ceased. Sudanese filled the civil service vacancies created by the progressive dismissal of Egyptians. The Sudan government prohibited Egyptians from immigrating into the territory.

The British, who took a paternalistic pride in the Sudan administration, placed major emphasis on balancing the budget through economic development. The most ambitious scheme, the cultivation of long-staple cotton in the Gazirah (the district between the Blue and the White Niles south of Khartum), was implemented after the completion in 1925 of the Sannar dam, built by the Sudan government with loans from British private investors. The 24-year concession which a British syndicate obtained in 1926 stipulated that 40 percent of the cotton produced was to go to the Sudanese tenant farmers, 35 percent (gradu-

APRIL 15, 1953

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED  
22 EAST 38TH STREET • NEW YORK 16, NEW YORK

ally increased to 40 percent) to the Sudan government and 25 percent (gradually reduced to 20 percent) to the concessionaire. From the outset the government's receipts averaged at least one-fifth of its entire revenue. The tenants were allowed to retain all crops other than cotton.

The promotion of cotton in the Sudan stirred in Egyptian growers the fear of competition in the Lancashire market and of possible curtailment of Nile waters available to their own plantations. These grievances reinforced the resentment of the nationalists, who charged the Sudan government with playing favorites. They contrasted the non-interest-bearing loans which Egypt had credited to the Sudan before 1914 with the 6 percent bonds—interest guaranteed by the British government—which the Sudan floated in Britain after 1919. Population pressure was an even more serious consideration. The inhabited zone of Egypt, some 3.5 percent of the overall land area with severely limited prospects of expansion, could already boast the highest rural population density in the world. The nationalists thus viewed the Sudan as a territory which might siphon off the "excess."

Little wonder, then, that around the claim deriving from 19th-century conquests and the 1899 condominium agreement the nationalists developed the legend that the Sudan and Egypt constituted one fatherland and their inhabitants one people. Accurate statistics are not obtainable. But according to the most reliable estimates, between 66 and 75 percent of

the 7-8 million Sudanese are Muslims who speak their own Arabic dialects; the remainder, concentrated in the southern provinces, are Negroid pagans who use other languages than Arabic. The British, on their side, dwelt upon the Sudan's ethnic and linguistic differences.

### Claims and Counterclaims

The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, which brought the second occupation of Egypt to a close, reaffirmed the 1899 condominium arrangements but laid down that "the primary aim of . . . [the] administration in the Sudan must be the welfare of the Sudanese." Still, the governor-general of the Sudan was given discretion, in making new civil service appointments "for which qualified Sudanese are not available," to "select suitable candidates of British and Egyptian nationality."

Egyptian troops were once again placed at the governor-general's disposal; Egyptian immigration into the Sudan was reopened; and Egyptian nationals were assured equal treatment with British subjects "in matters of commerce . . . or the possession of property."

In fact, very few Egyptians settled in the Sudan, and the Egyptian government, which in 1925 (after a lapse of a dozen years) had resumed payment of an annual subvention—now fixed at £750,000—toward the Sudan budget, began to pare down the amount in 1938 and discontinued it altogether three years later. Britain, meanwhile, had steadily enlarged the proportion of Sudanese employed as civil servants, from less than 37 per-

cent of the total to nearly 85 percent in 1947. After 1936 the British also admitted Sudanese to senior posts. Within 12 years the number of such appointees reached 126, or 15 percent.

In response to pressures from the articulate segment of the Sudanese population the governor-general in 1943 created an Advisory Council for the Northern Provinces as the first step in developing representative institutions in the central government. Aside from the governor-general, who served as president, and three other British officials, who served as vice-presidents, this partly elective and partly nominated consultative body consisted of 28 Sudanese.

The articulate northern Sudanese were themselves divided by local tradition along sectarian lines. One group followed al-Sayyid Sir 'Abd-al-Rahman b. al-Mahdi, the son of the Mahdi, the leader of the successful rebellion 60 years earlier; a second, al-Sayyid Sir 'Ali al-Mighani. The Mahdi's son, who formed the Ummah (nation) party, enjoyed British favor and participated in the Advisory Council. Precisely for these reasons Mighani, who established the Ashiqqa (brothers) party, boycotted the Council and turned for support to Egypt, which by 1943 had once again begun to voice its demands for the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown.

(This is the second of three articles on the Anglo-Egyptian problem in the Sudan by Dr. Hurewitz, assistant professor of government, Near and Middle East Studies Program, School of International Affairs, Columbia University. His book, tentatively entitled, *Middle East Dilemmas: Background for United States Policy*, is scheduled for publication this spring.)

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 22 E. 38th St., New York 16, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: J. BARTLET BREBNER • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • JOHN MARSHALL • PHILIP E. MOSELY • MARGARET PARTON • ANNA LORD STRAUSS • SUMNER WELLES. JOHN W. NASON, *President*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*; BLAIR BOLLES, *Washington Correspondent*; FELICE NOVICH, *Assistant Editor*. • *The Foreign Policy Association contributes to public understanding by presenting a cross section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors.* • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. Re-entered as second-class matter September 26, 1951 at the post office at New York, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

347

*Produced under union conditions and composed, printed and bound by union labor.*





## Demoralization of U. S. Foreign Service

Until Secretary of State Dulles on March 18 appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to support President Eisenhower's nomination of Foreign Service Officer Charles E. Bohlen as Ambassador to Moscow, the State Department was in danger of becoming a mere arm of Congress, as the foreign affairs department had been in the days of the Articles of Confederation before the adoption of the Constitution in 1789.

In the brief period since President Eisenhower's inauguration on January 20 the efforts of the State Department to satisfy the demands of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, respecting the personnel of the Voice of America had begun to erode the executive independence of the important governmental agency of which the Voice is a part. The eagerness of the Senate to limit that independence has been underlined by the backing given to the resolution for amending the Constitution introduced by Senator John W. Bricker, Republican of Ohio, who would restrict the application of treaties signed by the Secretary of State on behalf of the President. Senator Bricker has 63 cosponsors for his resolution, or enough, with his own vote, to make up the two-thirds of the Senate required to adopt the measure.

### State Department Weakened

While the spirit Secretary Dulles showed in the Bohlen affair may likewise inspire a vigorous campaign by the Administration against the Bricker amendment, the inroads made earlier by the Senate into the independence of the State Depart-

ment have seriously weakened the organization on which the department relies to staff American diplomatic missions abroad—that is, the Foreign Service.

The Foreign Service is the career arm in the conduct of this country's foreign relations. Founded in 1926 by a merger of the diplomatic and consular corps, it was enlarged and invigorated by legislation seven years ago. Its prestige has grown since World War II by the ever increasing proportion of ambassadors drawn from its ranks, and by the fact that the important State Department policy-making post of Counselor was twice filled by its officers—first by George F. Kennan and more recently by Bohlen himself.

### Value of Foreign Service

The Service is useful to the United States if its members are free to analyze for the policy makers in Washington the meaning of events in the areas of the world which it is their business to understand. Recent actions threaten this freedom. Senators McCarthy and Pat McCarran, Democrat of Nevada, have questioned the good faith of members of the Foreign Service for attitudes they took on past issues in international relations. The first to feel their criticism was John Carter Vincent, who was in charge of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department during the period immediately after World War II. Because Vincent was associated with the development of the policy which did not prevent the Communist conquest of China, it was implied that he actively encouraged that conquest. Because the issue of freedom to report and analyze was at stake,

the harassment of Vincent proved demoralizing to the Foreign Service.

This demoralization was intensified when Senate critics raised doubts about Bohlen's qualifications to serve as Ambassador to Moscow on the ground that he was President Roosevelt's interpreter at Yalta and that when he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he defended the Yalta agreements. The Committee approved the nomination, 15 to 0, after Mr. Dulles spoke up for Bohlen, but subsequently Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat of Arkansas, obliquely but disturbingly raised doubts to whether Bohlen was "loyal."

The serious question is whether the Senate, by a kind of postaudit of his work, should control the honest actions of a civil servant responsible to an agency of the executive branch of the government. Secretary Dulles' disposition of the problems raised by the cases of Vincent and Bohlen has not settled this question. The Secretary cast doubt on the ability of both these men to participate in policy-making decisions and that doubt contains the germ of paralysis for the whole Service. First, the Secretary retired Vincent, who, since his days in the Far Eastern Bureau, has served as Minister to Switzerland and chief of mission in Tangier. Mr. Dulles courageously cleared Vincent of the taint of disloyalty which Senators had imputed to him and of which the federal Loyalty Board had found him guilty. He noted, however, that Vincent's opinions about China had been unsound and did not merit his retention in the Service. Second, in his appearance before the Senate

*(Continued on page 8)*



## What Should the New Administration Do About Latin America?

by Robert J. Alexander

Dr. Alexander, assistant professor of economics at Rutgers University and author of *The Perón Era*, published by Columbia University Press in 1951, spent two months in Latin America last summer.

**T**HE Eisenhower Administration can do five things about Latin America: (1) Show Latin Americans that the United States is seriously concerned about Latin America; (2) support democratic elements in that continent; (3) encourage economic development; (4) impress upon United States investors there who still do not realize it that they are guests in foreign countries; (5) encourage the international exchange of persons.

1. The thing Latin Americans resent most about United States policy is their impression that Washington has been so concerned with events in Europe and Asia it has not had time to spare for Latin America. Some attention to that area in speeches of leading officials of the Administration, particularly President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, would go far to remove the impression that we are ignoring Latin America.

This is particularly important for the present Administration. Latin Americans have unhappy memories of the last period of Republican rule, which they recall as an era of the Big Stick and armed intervention on behalf of United States investors. Public attention by leading officials of the Eisenhower Administration to Latin American affairs would counteract an inclination of many Latin Americans to feel that United States policy in the region will be left to the determination of American businessmen with personal interests at stake.

2. Dictatorships are all too prevalent in Latin America, and our attitude toward them, in the opinion of

Latin Americans, has left much to be desired. We have shown too much willingness to give dictators more and more guns and aircraft with which to maintain their tyrannies. The policy of using nonrecognition as a weapon against regimes of which we do not approve was frowned upon by the Truman Administration. Even though nonrecognition may not be an adequate answer to the problem, the United States should certainly be more discriminating in its treatment of its Latin American neighbors.

### Democrats Need Aid

In this connection the Administration should remember that the best friends of the United States are not found only among those who believe in "free enterprise." The anti-Communist Left is the most significant obstacle to totalitarianism in the area, and thus the most important pro-United States group. Communism and Peronismo enjoy wide support because significant elements in the middle and working classes are discontented with things as they now are, and want land reforms, social insurance, trade unionism, government-supported industrialization, educational facilities and other things, all of which may not seem desirable to conservative Republicans.

The parties which can meet Communists and Peronistas on their own grounds and defeat them where they are strong are those which can arouse the same enthusiasm and idealism the totalitarians are able to stimulate; can appeal to the desire of the Latin American masses for far-reach-

ing social reforms; but can accompany promises of such reforms with adherence to the methods of political democracy.

Here again, official recognition of the problem of democracy versus dictatorship in Latin America by leading Administration members would be exceedingly helpful. Latin American democrats must not be allowed to feel that propaganda for democracy by us is only a cloak for our national interests in the cold war and that we have no interest in democracy's fate if there is no immediate Communist danger. In Latin America the greatest danger to democracy is represented by Peronismo and military dictatorship rather than by communism, although both are anti-United States. Recognition of this by leading Administration spokesmen would go far to allay the suspicions of Latin American democrats that they have been completely abandoned by Washington.

3. There is a tremendous feeling of urgency in Latin American countries about developing their economies. Latin Americans conscious of the problem realize that the one place where they can get aid in the task of raising their countries' productivity, and thus the living standards of their peoples, is the United States. Many of them feel that our postwar performance did not measure up to our rather extravagant promises of aid during World War II.

American aid should take three forms. First, the already considerable program of Point Four technical aid should be further extended. Latin

(Continued on page 6)

by Arthur P. Whitaker

Dr. Whitaker is professor of Latin American history at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of *The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1941) and editor of *Inter-American Affairs, 1944-45* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1944 and 1945), 2 volumes.

**T**HE confusion in our Latin American policy has increased, is increasing, and should be diminished.

The solution does not lie in piecemeal improvement of our handling of any specific issue, such as communism, Peronism, Point Four, or the bilateral military pacts. There is ample room and urgent need for such improvement, but this will prove transient and illusory unless the new Administration cures two radical defects from which its predecessor's so-called policy towards Latin America suffered throughout the last decade. One was lack of coordination in the government; the other was lack of continuity in the "policy."

There was a scandalous lack of coordination among the score of government agencies which shared with the State Department the handling of Latin American affairs. The State Department was unable to compel coordination, much less the acceptance of its own views. On the contrary, it was several times overruled on important issues by other agencies, such as the Pentagon, Commerce, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, sometimes with deplorable results.

A recent illustration is the RFC's refusal, contrary to State Department advice, to grant a Bolivian request for an increase in the price of tin. Some observers believe that this refusal helped to precipitate the Bolivian revolution which brought to power a government committed to the expropriation of the tin mines and largely controlled by a Communist, Juan Lechín, who is a Trotskyite, to be sure, but still a Communist.

Even if these observers are mistaken, the incident was a disturbing illustration of the permanently chaotic policy-making situation in Washington. Although there was machinery to produce coordination, in the case of Latin America it frequently failed to work.

Even worse, if possible, was the erratic course of our Latin American policy during the past decade. In this case it appears that the State Department itself was largely to blame. The prime illustration is provided by the case of the Perón regime in Argentina. Half a dozen times in a decade the State Department blew first hot then cold on Perón. This is probably one of the chief reasons why neither treatment worked. In the process we lost face and friends in Latin America at large, and at the end of it (we hope it is the end) Perón's regime seems as strongly entrenched as ever, and as unfriendly to the United States.

### Cause and Cure

I am well aware that the same defects have marked our policy towards other parts of the world at various times; but in the past decade they have been most frequent and persistent in our conduct of Latin American affairs. What is the cause? And what the cure?

Some find the cause in the fact that since 1943 the highest Latin American officer in the State Department has held the comparatively low rank of Assistant Secretary of State. Higher rank might have helped, for all these Assistant Secretaries, from Nelson Rockefeller and Spruille Braden

to Edward J. Miller, were men of outstanding ability and wide knowledge of the Latin American field. But that is only a symptom, and the cause lies much deeper. I find it in a national schizophrenia growing out of our foreign policy revolution of the early 1940's. Before 1940 our policy was reflected in the State Department's dictum in 1928 that "Pan-Americanism takes first place in our diplomacy"—a position which was strongly reinforced in the Good Neighbor decade that followed.

But then came the policy revolution mentioned above, and since 1943 Pan-Americanism has come close to taking last place in our diplomacy. Yet many of the older habits of Hemispheric thought and feeling have survived—hence the schizophrenia. Thus, we have gone on expecting the Latin Americans to be as friendly and cooperative as they were in the heyday of Pan-Americanism; and when faced with the incredible fact that they are not, we have a nervous breakdown and begin to scream about Communist-Peronist conspiracies, demagogues, dictators and whatnot.

The danger to us from such sources is real, but screaming about them will do no good. If Latin America is so important to us, then we must be willing to pay the price for improving our relations with it and keeping them that way—no solution is ever permanent. The price will not have to be paid only, or even largely, in money, but first and foremost in a sustained effort on the part of the high command in Washington to restore the coordination and continuity and dignity so conspicuously lacking in our Latin American policy of the past decade.

If I were shaping this policy, I would do the following things: (1) Shift the emphasis in inter-American

(Continued on page 6)

## Alexander

(Continued from page 4)

America was the first and most successful field of application of the Point Four principle. Yet the possibilities of this principle have been only barely scratched.

Second, there should be more extensive United States public investment in Latin America. This could be through extension of the lending powers of the Export-Import Bank, through expansion of the operations of the International Bank, or through government aid to expanded private investment. Attention should also be given to the possibility of extending the principle of grants instead of loans for worth-while development projects which will not be self-liquidating.

4. Although the Administration should do all it can to encourage United States private investment, it should also make it clear to United States companies operating in Latin America which have not yet learned this that they are guests in a foreign country. A situation such as that in Costa Rica, where the United Fruit Company plays Communist unions

off against non-Communist ones, backing whichever is weaker so as to prevent unionization of its workers, and where the United States Ambassador intervenes to prevent the local government from granting a small wage increase to United Fruit Company employees, should not be permitted.

5. Finally, it is still true that the United States is its own best salesman. The program of bringing Latin Americans here to study, to learn techniques in American government and industry, and to travel should be expanded. Most Latin Americans who have benefited from such programs return home our friends. Unfortunately such programs are now critically hampered by the McCarran-Walter Act and other similar legislation. The revision of this act is certainly a must for the further improvement of our relations with Latin America.

## Whitaker

(Continued from page 5)

defense measures from military to economic and political. (2) Attack communism through inter-American channels. We have abjured interven-

tion, but inter-American agreements provide a basis for action in this matter. (3) Give legitimate protection to United States business interests but stop promoting free enterprise as a panacea for all countries. (4) Greatly increase the cultural interchange program. (5) Restore our Latin American policy, not to "first place in our diplomacy" (no sane person would want to do that today), but to a higher place than it has had these last ten years. (6) Clarify our definition of the relation of our Latin American policy to our global policy, and of the Organization of American States to the United Nations.

With a cabinet composed almost exclusively of businessmen, the chances of adopting some of these suggestions may not prove too bright. But there is hope of considerable improvement in the talents, influence and known views of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, John M. Cabot. It is my hope that they will give us a real Latin American policy and a good one.



FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

## War or Peace with Russia? — 2

The significance of the Senate debate about the nomination of Charles E. Bohlen as United States Ambassador to Moscow transcended the issue of Mr. Bohlen's personal qualifications for the diplomatic post of greatest importance to the United States, and even the larger question of the relationship between the Executive and Congress in the making of foreign policy. At stake in this debate was nothing less than the problem whether, through the use of diplomacy, the United States can succeed in reduc-

ing the dangerous tensions between the non-Communist world and the U.S.S.R. and bring to an honorable close the war operations in Korea as well as in Indochina; where Washington has promised additional aid to France.

Both President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles have stated on several occasions—most recently when the President replied to a press conference question on March 19—that the Administration would view seriously and sym-

pathetically any proposals the Soviet government might want to make through "proper channels" and would never meet them "less than halfway." Such channels are normally provided by properly accredited diplomatic representatives. It is therefore of paramount importance that Washington, in this critical period of change within the ranks of the Soviet government, should have an experienced, well-informed ambassador in Moscow—and it is the President's personal belief that Mr.



Bohlen fulfills this requirement. It is also essential, if an opportunity for useful negotiations arises, that the American Ambassador to Moscow should enjoy not only the confidence of the Executive but also of the Senate, which under the Constitution has the power to confirm ambassadors. It is this confidence, necessary to the success of future negotiations, which Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, with the support of Senators Pat McCarran and Styles Bridges, endeavored in advance to destroy.

### Reasons for Fear

Many thoughtful and patriotic Americans, watching the Senate debate over Bohlen's appointment, felt troubled by the apathy over McCarthy's attacks, which sought to impugn the veracity of Mr. Dulles and the political judgment of the President, as well as by the extent to which the actions of the Senator from Wisconsin have been commended not only among the less well-informed sectors of the population but also in highly educated professional and business circles. The dictum, "Where there's smoke, there must be fire," is now seen to have raised a smoke screen across the land through which it is difficult to distinguish truth from falsehood, legitimate doubt from malicious insinuation. The result, which our worst enemies would surely give much to achieve, has been to create a widespread state of fear hardly calculated to encourage the cool and courageous judgment required to appraise the world crisis and to weigh possible courses of action.

This state of fear is understandable. No responsible person would want to minimize the real dangers that face the United States. American forces are locked in bitter combat with the Chinese Communist armies in Korea which by the admission of

Andrei Y. Vishinsky, now Russia's permanent delegate to the United Nations, are supplied by the U.S.S.R. The Kremlin has been conducting a "hate" campaign against the United States and has accused Washington of seeking to subvert not only the Soviet government but also the regimes of Russia's Eastern European satellites—an accusation rejected by the Political and Security Committee of the United Nations on March 26. American citizens have been charged with acting as Soviet spies in an effort to discover the secrets of atomic warfare. Americans in various walks of life have either voluntarily admitted or have allowed it to be inferred that they have at one time or another—usually either in the 1930's or during the early period of World War II—been members of the Communist party in the United States.

Confronted by these developments, all of which—particularly spying—are new in the experience of this country, many Americans have understandably become alarmed and have tended to accept all expressions of anti-Communist sentiment and all denunciations of the U.S.S.R. as inspired solely by patriotism and as necessary to safeguard this country's security.

### Danger of Fear

This attitude, if carried to a logical conclusion, could have inspired a desire to break off with the U.S.S.R. and to seek a way out of the many painful problems of East-West relations through actions described by various press and radio commentators as "dynamic," "positive" or "drastic," even at the risk of war.

Again, no responsible person would contend that war should be avoided at all costs if the alternative is national subjection to another power. In World War II millions of people subscribed to the slogan, "It is better

to die on one's feet than live on one's knees." Nor do references to the ultimate horrors of atomic warfare necessarily justify avoidance of war, except in the case of confirmed pacifists, whose views deserve the utmost respect. For obviously pre-atomic warfare was capable of destroying millions of human beings, as was tragically demonstrated in World War I before the large-scale development of air, not to speak of atomic, warfare.

The question remains, however, whether any government, no matter how much its patience has been tried and its previous hopes for peace have been disappointed, can pass up any opportunity, no matter how slight, of averting another world holocaust. The Chinese Communists, seconded by the Kremlin, have once again held out the prospect of a truce in Korea. Soviet spokesmen have hinted broadly at the possibility of German reunification. The U.S.S.R., whatever its other motives, clearly seeks to prevent the rearmament of West Germany and Japan and to bring the Peiping regime into the UN.

No one in Washington can promise in advance that any negotiations which may take place with the Kremlin will bear fruit in ending the Korean war and creating at least a measure of stability. Nor will anyone expect a "permanent settlement"; no such settlement has ever been reached in history. What President Eisenhower has made clear is that the patient exploration of prospects for peaceful adjustments, rather than the reckless assumption that war offers the only way out, will govern his Administration's attitude toward the U.S.S.R. Neither the majority of Americans, nor the millions in Europe and Asia to whom the United States offers leadership in the struggle for freedom, will call this treason.

VERA MICHELES DEAN  
(The second of two articles.)

## As Others See Us

Europeans are naturally concerned about the future policy of the U.S.-S.R. and about the attitude of the United States toward Russia. Writing in the independent, moderately conservative *Le Figaro* on March 12, André Siegfried, well-known political scientist, said: "American democracy is truly a régime in which public opinion is supreme; that is its greatness and also its danger. Each American, however modest his condition, forms an opinion and gives it freely. He is not content to judge his own country's affairs. He also feels entitled to express approval or condemnation of everything that goes on in the world, and more often than not he does so from a moral point of view, as if he were the judge of human behavior in every country."

Siegfried points out why Americans are tired of the Korean war—"a sword of Damocles hanging over every family." He is worried, however, that some Americans have an attitude of, "If there must be war with Russia, let's get it over with." He goes on: "I hardly know of any European who would talk like that, because for us war is death, pure and simple, the end of everything. . . . We know quite well that the United

States does not want war, but to have it spoken of as something that can be contemplated is too much for a Europe which stands on the edge of the pit. The Americans ought to see that."

Writing just before Stalin's death, Paul Sethe said in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine* of March 3 and 4 that the main danger is indifference to what the Communist leaders think. Rearmament, he contends, is essential, but it must be accompanied by an understanding of Russian motives; and these motives, in his opinion, are mainly two, one just as important as the other: the desire to bring about the world revolution and the fear that Russia will be attacked. "War is not entirely to be excluded, but it is only a means and not at all the most important." As for Russia's fear of invasion, says Sethe, its experiences immediately after the Revolution, when Japanese, British, French and American troops marched against the Reds, have "deeply branded Bolshevik thinking. . . . It is rather childish to believe that our protestations of peace, sincere though they be, are enough to obliterate those experiences."

Sethe concludes: "A policy which does not cease to rearm but which at the same time does its best in sincere negotiations to destroy Russian fears is not a priori doomed to failure. War need not take place."

## Newsletter

(Continued from page 3)

Committee on behalf of Bohlen, Secretary Dulles said he preferred not to have the ambassador-nominate in the policy-making job of Counselor. The fate of Vincent and the travails of Bohlen damage the morale of the remaining officers of the Foreign Service, whose advice traditionally is sought on policy matters and whose education and qualifications make them eager to be more than lackeys of the government.

The Service is often criticized, and many Americans sincerely believe that citizens untrained in diplomacy make better diplomats. But as long as the State Department relies on Foreign Service officers to provide the reports on which foreign policy is largely based, the Department can function effectively only if those officers are free to tell the facts and the truth as they see them without fear of having their careers destroyed and their professional reputations damaged because certain Senators who do not agree with them find the seeds of treason in their reaction to unpleasant world realities. This makes for cautious reports and the kind of blind foreign policy into which totalitarian states are apt to blunder and which democratic America has in the past been able to avoid.

BLAIR BOLLES

## FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

### In this issue:

Britain, Egypt and the Sudan—2—J. C. Hurewitz	1
Demoralization of U. S. Foreign Service—B. Bolles	3
What Should the New Administration Do in Latin America? —	
R. J. Alexander	4
A. P. Whitaker	5
War or Peace with Russia?—2—V. M. Dean	6
As Others See Us	8

### In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Report—

Britain's Economic Problem:

Its Meaning for U. S.,

by Gardner Cowles, publisher of LOOK

CASE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY  
MAIN BLDG. - LIBR.  
10900 EUCLID AVE.  
CLEVELAND 6, OHIO

xxxii:15, 4.15.53